Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Lori Waters v. Garth T. Howard, Jean Howard :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Garth Howard, Afton Jean Howard; Appellees Pro Se.
Bruce Plenk; Utah Legal Services; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Waters v. Howard, No. 920662 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3648

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU

:.

"
o
WW?
DOCKET NO. -

^:&AH COURT OF APPEALS
*
*
*
*

LORI WATERS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

920662-CA

*

GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON
JEAN HOWARD,

*

Priority No* I 5
T r i a l Case N o . 8 9 3 0 0 1 4 4 9 CV

Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
HONORABLE PAUL G. GRANT, PRESIDING

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellant
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891

Garth Howard
Afton Jean Howard
Appellees
Pro Se
4125 South 430 East, Apt. 103
Murray, Utah 84107
2

El

LED
*"!TITA«**-I.

lti

Utih Court of Appeal*
JAN 2 2 1993

J.

7

Mary T, Noonan

CterK of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*
*

LORI WATERS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

it
it

*

vs.

Case No. 920662-CA

it

GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON
JEAN HOWARD,

it
it
it

Defendants/Appellees.

ie

Trial Case No.893001449 CV

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
HONORABLE PAUL G. GRANT, PRESIDING

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellant
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891

Garth Howard
Afton Jean Howard
Appellees
Pro Se
4125 South 430 East, Apt. 103
Murray, Utah 84107

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
I.

AFTER HOWARD COMMITTED FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
DETAINER BY PHYSICALLY EXCLUDING WATERS FROM
THE PREMISES, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
WATERS ' COMPLAINT

4

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING HOWARD'S
SELF-HELP EVICTION

5

III. HOWARD'S EVICTION OF WATERS WITHOUT NAMING HER IN
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE OR IN THE WRIT OF
RESTITUTION VIOLATED HER RIGHT OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONS

6

II.

IV.

THE WRIT OF RESTITUTION WAS VOID AS TO WATERS
SINCE THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER WATERS
BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A NAMED PARTY

CONCLUSION

11
15

ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Code §78-36-1

1

2.

Utah Code §78-36-7

2

3.

Utah Code §78-36-10

3

4.

Utah Code §78-36-12

4

5.

Utah Code §78-36-12.3

5

6.

Minute Entry

6
ii

7.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

7-1

8.

Judgment •

8-1

9.

Order and Final Judgment

9-1

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Arrieta v. Mahon. 644 P.2d 1249 (Cal. 1982)

8,9

Buchanan v. Crites. 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944)

5,9

Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc.. 200 U.A.R. 61 (Utah App. 1992)..

2

Carlson v. Bos. 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987)

13

Fowler v. Seiter. 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1992)

5

Fults v. Munro. 95 N.E. 23 (N.Y.App. 1911)

14,15

Graham v. Sawava. 632 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981)

13

Greene v. Lindsev, 456 U.S. 444 (1982)

6,7

King v. Firm. 285 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1955)

5

Mendoza v. Small Claims Court of Los Angeles Judicial
District. 321 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1958)

8

Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co.. 339 U.S. 306 (1949)

7,8
11

Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)
Paxton v. Fisher. 45 P.2d 903 (Utah 1935)

10,11
5

Pease v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 694 P.2d 613 (Utah
1984)

13

Pentecost v. Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985)

5,6

Perkins v. Spencer. 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952)

12

State in the Interest of L.G.W.. 638 P.2d 527 (Utah 1981)

10

State v. Gibbs. 500 P.2d 209 (Idaho 1972)

10

W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency. 802 P.2d 755 (Utah
App. 1990)

11

iv

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code §78-2a-3(2) (d)

1

Utah Code §78-4-11

1

Utah Code §78-36-1

4

Utah Code §78-36-3

9

Utah Code §78-36-7

2,12

Utah Code §78-36-8

9

Utah Code §78-36-8.5

9

Utah Code §78-36-9

9

Utah Code §78-36-10

2,9

Utah Code §78-36-12

2,5,6

Utah Code §78-36-12.3

2,5,6

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LORI WATERS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

*

*

vs.

Case No. 920662-CA

GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON
JEAN HOWARD,
*

Defendants/Appellees.

*

Trial Case No.893001449 CV

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code §§78-2a-3(2)(d) and 78-4-11.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1) May a tenant who was known to the landlord but not named
as a defendant to an unlawful detainer action and never served in
that action be evicted pursuant to a writ of restitution issued
against a former tenant without violating the due process clause
of the Utah or United States Constitutions?
2) Is a landlord guilty of forcible entry or forcible
detainer or wrongful eviction of a tenant when he files an
eviction action against a former tenant only, obtains a writ of
restitution against that former tenant only but does not have the
writ executed, then nails shut the doors to the rented dwelling
and chains off the driveway while aware of the tenancy of the
current tenant?
The trial court granted summary judgment finding no due

process violation, no jurisdictional defect, no forcible entry or
detainer and no wrongful eviction. This court should review the
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Waters, the
losing party below and resolve doubts or uncertainties about the
facts in Waters' favor. The trial court's legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness. Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 200
U.A.R. 61, 62 (Utah Ct. of App., filed Nov.13, 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code §§ 78-36-1, 7, 10, 12, and 12.3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action for conversion, forcible entry and detainer,
wrongful eviction, and other claims was filed by Waters against
her former landlord, Howard.[R.1-6]

The action was set for

trial. [R.31] On the court's own motion, the landlord's trial
brief was deemed a motion for summary judgment on the issues of
forcible entry and detainer and wrongful eviction and granted
without testimony or affidavits being presented. [R.63-4, 71-75]
The trial court found that the facts were not in dispute. In
October, 1988, Waters rented the premises at 1067 East Diamond
Way, Sandy, Utah, from Krukowskis, who had previously purchased
the property from Howard on a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
[R.51, 53] Krukowskis defaulted on their contract with Howard.
[R.23-27] Howard served an eviction notice on Krukowskis and had
them served with an unlawful detainer complaint filed in Murray
Circuit Court [R.44]. Both the eviction notice and the summons
and complaint were served on Krukowskis at an address different
2

than the Diamond Way address. [R.44]
Howard spoke with Waters at the premises in early December,
when she informed him that she had paid rent to Krukowskis.
[R.72, para.5] Howard and Waters were unable to agree on rental
terms. [R.49, 72, para.2] Howard obtained a default judgment
against Krukowskis. [R.72# para.6] Howard also obtained a writ of
restitution directed against Krukowskis and ordering the removal
from the premises of "any and all persons claiming an interest in
the premises through Krukowskis." [R.45] A constable posted the
writ on the premises.[R.45] Subsequently, Howard attempted to
remove Waters from the premises as a trespasser.[R.58] When that
failed, Howard nailed the entrances to the premises shut and
chained shut the gate to the driveway, denying Waters access to
the premises [R.59]
The trial court found that Howard had acted properly in
excluding Waters from the premises without judicial process
because she was a mere trespasser not a tenant since her rights
as a tenant were derivative through Krukowskis [R.73]. The trial
court further found that not naming Waters as a party in the
eviction action against Krukowskis was proper and that posting
the writ of restitution rather than personally serving it was
proper [R.73-74]. Judgment against Waters dismissing her
complaint no cause of action on these issues was entered on
September 23, 1991 [R.76-77]. A notice of appeal was filed but
subsequently withdrawn.[78-79,81-82]. The remaining issues were
resolved at a hearing on May 21, 1992 and a final judgment was
3

entered on September 20, 1992 [R.83] The notice of appeal was
filed on September 29, 1992 [R85].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Howard wrongfully evicted Waters by failing to name her in
an eviction action he filed against a former tenant or in the
writ of restitution he obtained even though he knew she was the
tenant in possession. He then forcibly excluded her from the
premises, committing forcible entry. The trial court erroneously
granted Howard summary judgment dismissing Waters' claims. Since
the writ of restitution procedure was without jurisdiction over
Waters and since her right to due process under both the state
and federal constitutions was violated, the trial court erred in
dismissing her claims.
ARGUMENT
I. AFTER HOWARD COMMITTED FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
BY PHYSICALLY EXCLUDING WATERS FROM THE PREMISES,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING WATERS' COMPLAINT
Howard never served an eviction notice upon Waters, never
served her in an eviction action nor caused her to be removed
from the premises by a sheriff or constable executing a writ of
restitution, despite his knowledge of her tenancy [R. 63, 72
paras. 4 and 5]. Instead, Howard "evicted" Waters by nailing the
doors shut and chaining the driveway [R.68 para.8].

Howard's

self-help actions excluded Waters from the premises without
judicial process and constituted forcible entry and detainer.
Utah Code §78-36-1 prevents landlords from using violence or
force to retake property rather than proceeding with an eviction

4

action. In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), the
Utah Supreme Court found an action for forcible entry existed
where an apartment manager removed a tenant's property from the
premises without judicial process. This case is similar in that
Waters was locked out and prevented from using her apartment and
her property by Howard's actions.
Old Utah cases reach the same conclusion and are still good
law: self-help evictions of any sort by a landlord are unlawful
and subject the offending owner to liability both pursuant to the
forcible entry statute for possession and incidental damages and
in tort for additional damages. King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114, 1118
(Utah 1955); Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100,102 (Utah 1944);and
Paxton v. Fisher, 45 P.2d 903,906 (Utah 1935). See also# Fowler
v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App.1992). The trial court's
conclusions of law [R. 63-64, 73-4, paras. 1, 4, 5,and 6] and
judgment sanctioning the forcible entry [R.76,para. 2] are in
error and should be reversed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING HOWARD'S
SELF-HELP EVICTION
Under Utah law "[i]t is unlawful for an owner to willfully
exclude a tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except
by judicial process . . . "

Utah Code § 78-36-12.

Section 78-36-

12.3(1) defines willful exclusion as "preventing the tenant from
entering into the premises with intent to deprive the tenant of
such entry."

Here Howard has clearly violated this statute yet

the trial court explicitly found that plaintiff had no remedy
against Howard [R. 64, 73, para.5]. This conclusion is erroneous.

5

The rationale behind Utah's law mandating judicial process
before eviction lies in preventing breaches of the peace brought
about through self-help. Pentecost v. Harward at 700. Here
again, the trial court's conclusion that Waters was a trespasser
and that Howard had some right to physically prevent her from
entering the premises she had rented is in error [R.64, 73, para.
4], sanctions just such breaches of the peace and is a serious
distortion of this frequently articulated state public policy.
This court should reverse.
III. HOWARD'S EVICTION OF WATERS WITHOUT NAMING HER IN THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE OR IN THE WRIT OF RESTITUTION
VIOLATED HER RIGHT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AS
GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS.
Tenants in possession have a due process right to receive
legal notice before eviction. In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444
(1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that by failing to give
tenants adequate notice of the proceedings against them before
issuing final orders of eviction, the Kentucky statute deprived
them of property without due process of law as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Greene court

stated:
[i]n this case, appellees have been deprived of a
significant interest in property: indeed, of the right
to continued residence in their homes. . . The
sufficiency of notice must be tested with reference to
its ability to inform people of the pendency of the
proceedings that affect their interests. In arriving
at this constitutional assessment, we look to the
realities of the case before us: In determining the
constitutionality of a procedure established by the
State to provide notice in a particular class of cases,
'its effect must be judged in light of its practical
application . . .'

6

456 U.S. at 451. (emphasis added).

In Greene, the summons and

complaint were posted on the door and never received.

Waters did

not receive notice, but for a different reason - she was not a
named party.

But like the tenants in Greene, Waters was deprived

of a significant interest in property - the right to continued
residence in her home - without due process of law.
The Greene court applied principles of due process
established in Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313-315 (1949), the landmark case mandating proper notice
before deprivation of property.

The Mullane court stated:

[t]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due
Process Clause] requires that deprivation of life,
liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case. . . . This right to be heard has
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to
appear or default, acquiesce or contest. . . . An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.
Mullane established federal due process notice standards.
Waters was not given any such notice. While the trial court found
that she was aware of the eviction proceeding against Krukowski,
[R.63, 73 para.3], that court also found that not including her
in the eviction case or even naming her in the writ of
restitution was proper [R.74, para.5]. It would have been simple
for Howard to include her as a party or to amend the complaint
and add her name since he was surely aware of her identity after
he met with her but was unable to agree on rental terms [R.72,
7

paras.4, 5]. Instead of taking either of these simple steps,
Howard proceeded with the eviction suit that named only
Krukowskis as parties. The trial court erroneously ratified this
action [R.74, para.5].
State courts such as California have applied a similar due
process analysis to notice, relying on their state constitution's
clauses as well as the fourteenth amendment.

"Possession of a

tenant is a substantial right....[N]o one, consistent with
constitutional safeguards, can be deprived of the possession or
title to property, or any other substantial right, without
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." Mendoza v. Small
Claims Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, 321 P.2d 9, 12
(Cal. 1958).
Relying on Mendoza and Mullane, the California Supreme Court
found due process violated in a case much like the present one:
the eviction of a tenant in possession without the inclusion of
that tenant in the unlawful detainer suit. In Arrieta v. Mahon,
644 P.2d 1249 (Cal. 1982), the landlord filed an unlawful
detainer action for nonpayment against only a former co-tenant
even though the landlord had accepted rent from the other cotenant, who remained in possession, for more than eighteen
months. The first notice the tenant in possession had of the
action was when the marshall posted the writ ordering her to
vacate. That court held:
[n]otice 'reasonably calculated . . . to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections'
is, of course, an essential element of the right to a
8

hearing. Those who are evicted from their homes
pursuant to a writ issued against another receive no
notice or hearing whatever - unless by sheer good
fortune they discover the pendency of the action and
are able to block it through an extraordinary remedy.
Even those that know of the action may not know that
their own right to possession is in jeopardy if they
are not named in the writ or accompanying papers. In
either case, their eviction is manifestly contrary to
the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of
the California Constitution.
644 P.2d at 1253-54 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added). This analysis is of more than passing
significance given that Utah's eviction statute was copied from
California. Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d at 103.
The Arrieta court noted the danger of applying a writ to
unnamed persons.

The court stated:

[a]s the events which triggered this action prove, an
unnamed occupant may not discover the existence of the
unlawful detainer proceeding until the marshall appears
to put her and her children on the street. Thus, it is
quite possible that a tenant will be deprived of
possession before receiving a hearing.
664 P.2d at 1255.

In Utah, just as in California, the right to

notice and a pre-eviction hearing is clearly established in
unlawful detainer actions.

See Utah Code §§ 78-36-3, 78-36-8,

78-36-8.5(2)(c), 78-36-9, and 78-36-10.
Waters was situated similarly to the tenants in Arrieta and,
like those tenants, was deprived of possession before receiving a
hearing. The procedural difference in the two cases is not
significant. There the marshal posted the notice and would have
carried out the eviction but for a restraining order.

Here the

constable posted the writ of restitution and the landlord
9

physically turned out the tenant. In both cases the tenant was
removed from the premises by a landlord who knew they resided
there and chose to ignore their presence and their right by
invoking legal action solely against a non-resident former
tenant. The California court found a due process violation. This
court should also.
In non-eviction contexts, Utah courts have required adequate
notice to comply with state constitutional due process
requirements. For example, in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
1214 (Utah 1983), a pro se litigant was advised only two days
before trial that a "hearing" was actually to be a full trial,
not advised of his right to request a jury, and not given
adequate time to prepare a defense. A judgment against him of
$84,600 was entered.

On appeal the Supreme Court reversed,

finding a violation of due process which has been frequently
cited.
The court focused on "basic fairness of procedure" and
found that to comply with due process, there must be a "hearing"
which must be "prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs
the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet."
669 P.2d at 1213, citing State v. Gibbs, 500 P.2d 209 (Idaho,
1972). This analysis was similar to that used earlier in State in
the Interest of L.G.W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). Here the
only "notice" to Waters of the eviction was the posted writ of
restitution [R.45] and there never was a hearing which involved
her. Certainly this is more egregious than the facts in Nelson.
10

Waters' due process rights were violated; the trial court erred.
This court followed Nelson and Mullane in W. & G. Co. v.
Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 762 (Utah App. 1990) in
analyzing the procedure used to condemn blighted buildings for
redevelopment: "where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform
a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or her, a
party is deprived of due process." There this court found that,
although some hearings were apparently held to determine whether
downtown property was blighted, the property owners were never
advised that the hearings could affect them, were led to believe
the contrary and thus the procedure violated due process.
In this case, not only was a potentially interested party
not properly notified or given an opportunity for a hearing, as
in W. & G. Co., but Waters, a subtenant in possession, was not
even made a party to a proceeding that effectively extinguished
her constitutionally protected possession rights.
IV.

THE WRIT OP RESTITUTION WAS VOID AS TO WATERS
SINCE THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER WATERS
BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A NAMED PARTY.

The writ of restitution in this case, which the trial court
upheld as proper, [R. 73-4, paras. 5-6] ordered the removal of
Krukowskis "along with any and all persons claiming an interest
in the premises through defendant" [R.45]. The trial court found
Waters to be a trespasser and found that she held an interest
only through Krukowskis [R.73, paras.1,2, 4]. The trial court
dismissed Wafers' unlawful eviction claim in its summary judgment
order [R.76]. This decision was in error because there was no
11

jurisdiction over Waters in the eviction action, so applying the
writ to her and sanctioning her eviction in the absence of
jurisdiction is error.
The writ of restitution used in this case, [R.45], appears
to be drafted in compliance with Utah Code §78-36-7(2) yet
violates Waters' due process rights, both for the reasons
discussed above and because it purports to extend the
jurisdiction of the court over a person not served or a party to
the action.

This section states:

. . . All persons who enter under the tenant after the
commencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties
to the action.
While there may be a question as to when the action commenced,
the trial court's conclusions that not naming Waters in the
action or in the writ and evicting Waters as a tenant holding an
interest only through Krukowski was proper [R.74] appear to be
based on this statute. Yet in the absence of any claim of
jurisdiction, the trial court's conclusions and judgment on this
issue are erroneous and should be reversed.
This situation is similar to that in Perkins v. Spencer. 243
P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1952). There the trial court found and the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed that where an unlawful detainer
action was brought against a husband and wife and only the wife
was properly served with the notice to quit, the husband was not
in unlawful detainer, and there was no right of the landlord to
possession of the premises as against the husband. Howard here
had no right of possession against Waters.
12

Another similar situation arose in Pease v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 615-6 (Utah 1984). There the
Supreme Court reversed an award of worker's compensation benefits
against one partner of an employer partnership because there had
been no finding that that person was a partner nor had she been
notified of the hearing. The court stated:
Corinne Pease did not receive any notice of the
hearing to adjudicate Luther Sander's claim. She
was not an addressee of the notice of hearing sent
the Commission to Norco, Ray Peasef and Keith Norwood.
Nor was she listed on Sander's application for a hearing
either as a partner in Norco or as a statutory
employer....The order as to Corrine Pease was not valid
because she had not been personally served and there was no
basis in the findings for imposing liability on her as
a partner.
The decision was based on both the due process violation and the
lack of jurisdiction. As here, there was simply no way that a
valid order could be entered against a person never notified of
the proceedings that would affect her, never served, and never
even named in the lawsuit.
This same result is correct even if the argument be made
that the tenancy is a res and that a lower jurisdictional
standard is applicable to in rem proceedings. While this was
discussed and impliedly endorsed in Graham v. Sawava, 632 P.2d
851 (Utah 1981),

it was disavowed in Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d

1269, 1273 n.9 (Utah 1987). In that case, which focused on when
service on an out of state motorist could be accomplished by
serving the Utah Secretary of State, the court imposed an
obligation of making a "diligent effort" to locate an alleged
nonresident or departed resident motorist defendant before
13

alternative means of service pursuant to the statute would become
available. But even then, efforts to locate the person against
whom a judgment was sought were required, they were to be named
in the lawsuit, and notice attempted.
Here, by contrast, the procedure used and the statute which
appears to authorize such action requires no such effort, but
allows a landlord to merely sue a tenant who is no longer
residing in the premises and end up with a judgment enforceable
against another person, a non-party subtenant. Instead, this
court should impose a similar "diligent effort" standard on
landlords which would require them to identify and sue the actual
tenant in possession as well as any other person contractually
bound. Here Howard knew of Waters' presence in the apartment yet
failed to name her.
Since the trial court adopted this logic and found the
procedure valid and the judgment and writ of restitution
enforceable against Waters [R. 63, 73-4, paras. 1, 2, 4, 5, and
6], a greater wrong has been perpetrated here. The trial court
judgment should be reversed on both due process and
jurisdictional grounds.
An old New York case, Fults v. Munro, 95 N.E. 23, 25
(N.Y.App. 1911), resulted in a finding that a tenant in a similar
fact scenario had a cause of action against her landlord for
failing to name her as a party to the proceeding when he knew she
was in possession. The court found the tenant was not bound by
the unlawful detainer action and the eviction order was not valid
14

against her.

The court found the owner had unlawfully removed

Fults and awarded Fults treble damages for forcible detainer as
well as declaring the owner a trespasser.

The Fults court

stated:
She should have been joined as a party to the
proceeding, and it was a trespass to dispossess her
without giving her an opportunity to make her defense.
. . . She might have paid the rent to protect her
possession, or she might have taken a valid objection
to some of the landlord's proceedings.
Waters similarly should have been joined as a party to the
eviction proceeding and should have been given an opportunity to
raise any defenses.

Likewise, here the writ was invalid as the

court had not acquired jurisdiction over Waters. Without adequate
notice or jurisdiction, any judgment rendered against Waters was
void and her claims for wrongful eviction and forcible entry
should not have been dismissed on summary judgment [R.76, para.
2].

Rather they should have been granted summarily.
CONCLUSION
Waters was denied adequate notice and excluded from her

premises by self-help and without judicial process.

Eviction of

anyone not named in the writ violates their rights to procedural
due process and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. When
the trial court dismissed her forcible entry and wrongful
eviction claims, it sanctioned these unlawful actions and
committed error. The trial court's summary judgment dismissing
Waters' claims should be reversed, summary judgment granted to
her as to liability and the case remanded for a determination of
her damages.
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to: Garth and Afton
Jean Howard, 4125 South 430 East, Apt. 103, Murray, Utah 84107 on
this
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day of
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7S-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
<1) by breaking open doors, windows or other
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any real
property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
1953

78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding,
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for
the nonjoinder of any person who might have been
made a party defendant; but when it appears that any
of the parties served with process or appearing in the
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered
against those parties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after
the commencement of the action shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in
Section 78-38-13.
1992

78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent — Immediate enforcement —
Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may
be issued and enforced immediately.
1992

78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
1981

78-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1981
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Case
: 893001449 CV Civil
Case Title:
WATERS, LORI VS HOWARD, GARTH T

Party..: ATP
Name...:

3:35 P
Filing Date: 10/19/8
Judge: Paul G. Grant

Atty for Plaintiff

PLENCK, BRUCE

10/27/89 Case filed on 10/19/89.
800.00
10/30/89 Suit amount changed to
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY
12/19/89 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN
02/08/90 FILED DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
02/16/90 FILED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
02/27/90 FILED DEFAULT JUDGMENT-SIGNED BY JUDGE THORNE IN THE AMOUNT
$9750 00
Case judgment is Default - judge
03/30/90 FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
04/11/90 FILED: AMENDED NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
05/07/90 FILED: STIPULATION AND ORDER- SIGNED BY JUDGE THORNE
Case judgment is Set aside
05/16/90 **** FILED: ANSWER ********************************************
08/31/90 FILED: CERTIFICATE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL
09/13/90 TRL
scheduled for 10/12/90 at 2:00 P in room 1 with PGG
10/12/90 GRANT/BVO T8278 C2116 DPWOC, PLFT PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY
ATTY BRUCE PLENKE
C/O DEFT TO HIGHLIGHT IN RED AND DISPUTES AND SEND TO THE COURT
IF LIABILITY WILL SCHEDULE FOR DAMAGES
PROFFER ATTY PLENK, PROFFER DEFT
C/O BRIEF IN 10 DAYS FROM ATTY PLENK
10/22/90 FILED: PLAINTIFFS TRIAL MEMORANDUM
(BROOKE)
11/02/90 FILED: DEFENDANTS TRIAL MEMORANDUM AND ANSWER**(BROOKE)
01/04/91 JUDGE GRANT ENTERS ORDER:
THE FACTS SEEM REASONABLY CLEAR
IN THIS MATTER. DEFT EXECUTED A CONTRACT OF SALE WITH A 3RD
PARTY. THE 3RD PARTY DEFAULTED IN THE CONTRACT AND MOVED FROM
THE PREMISES IN OCTOBER 1988 AND PLAINTIFF'S TOOK POSSESSION OF
THE PREMISES BY AGREEMENT OF THE 3RD PARTY.
IN NOVEMBER DEFENDANTS MOVED TO SET ASIDE THE CONTRACT OF
SALE AND A WRIT OF RESTITUTION WAS GRANTED BY THE COURT. THAT
WRIT FORECLOSED ANY RIGHTS THAT PLAINTIFF HELD IN THE PREMISES
BECAUSE SHE WAS IN POSSESSION ONLY UNDER THE ASPECESS OF THE
3RD PARTY. THERE WAS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
EITHER BY WRITTEN OR ORAL LEASE.
PLAINTIFF HAD NOTICE OF THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND KNEW THAT
SHE MUST MOVE FROM THE PREMISES BECAUSE HER RIGHTS OF POSSESSION
WERE ONLY GOOD SO LONG AS THE THIRD PARTY HAD ANY LEGAL RIGHTS.
IN DECEMBER A NEGOTIATION FOR A MONTH TO MONTH RENTAL WAS
ATTEMPTED BUT NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. THEREFORE IN JANUARY
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Case
: 893001449 CV Civil
Case Title:
WATERS, LORI VS HOWARD, GARTH T

r-j

Filing Date: 10/19/8
Judge: Paul G. Grant

01/04/91 1989, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A TENANT BUT A TRESPASSER.
DEFENDANT REQUESTED THE SERVICES OF A PEACE OFFICER TO REMOVE
THE TRESPASSER FROM THE PREMISES. WHEN THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
ON THE PREMISES, THE DEFENDANT SECURED THE BUILDING BY NAILING
THE ENTRANCES CLOSED.
IN DOING SO, HE HAD TO BE AWARE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BELONGING
TO THE PLIANTIFF ON THE PREMISES. BY NOT PROVIDING A WAY FOR
THE PLAINTIFF TO TAKE POSSESSION OF THAT PERSONAL PROPERTY AND
AN ACTUAL CONVERSION WHEN REFUSING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY ON A
SUBSEQUENT DATE BUT DID A FEW DAYS LATER ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO
RETRIEVE THE GOODS.
IF PLAINTIFF HAS A REMEDY FOR EXCLUSSION FROM THE PREMISES, IT
IS AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY NOT DEFENDANT'S.
A RESONABLE DAMAGE FOR THE CONVERSION OF PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL
PROPERTY WOULD NEED TO BE DETERMINED BY SAPERATE HEARING BUT
WOULD NOT EXCEED THE SUM OF $150.00 UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
STATED TO THE COURT.
COPY OF DOCKET PRINT MAILED TO BOTH PARTIES
End of the docket report for this case.
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
3636 Constitutional Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119
LORI WATERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON
HOWARD,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*

Civil No. 893001449CV

This matter came on for trial on the 12th day of October, 1990
before the Hon. Paul G.Grant, judge of the above court. Plaintiff
was present and represented by Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services,
Inc. Defendants were present and represented themselves. The court
reviewed the file in this matter, heard argument from counsel and
defendant and requested briefs on the issues raised. Each party
submitted a brief. The court deemed defendants' brief to be a
motion for summary judgment on the issue of forcible entry and
detainer and wrongful eviction.

Having reviewed the file in this

matter and the memoranda of the parties, the court now enters the
following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 28, 1988, defendants, as sellers, entered into

a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Randy and Brenda Krukowski as
buyers to convey real property located at 1067 East Diamond Way,
Sandy, Utah,
2.

On September 26, 1988, defendants filed an unlawful

detainer action against Krukowskis, alleging a default in payments
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract*
3.

in October of 1988, the Krukowskis vacated the premises

and rented the property to plaintiff.

Plaintiff moved into the

premises and paid rent to the Krukowskis.

The Krukowskis were

served in the unlawful detainer action at another address on
November 22, 1988.
4.

Plaintiff and Defendant Garth Howard spoke in December

but were unable to agree on terms for a month to month agreement.
5.

In early December 1988, Defendant Garth Howard came to

the premises to collect rent from Plaintiff.

She stated that she

had already paid rent for December to the Krukowskis.
6.

On December 5, 1988, a hearing was held on defendants'

unlawful detainer action against the Krukowskis in Murray Circuit
Court.

Judgment was entered in favor of Howards and against the

Krukowskis.
1.

On December 19, 1988, a writ of restitution was issued

against the Krukowskis.

On December 20, 1988, Deputy Constable

Christian posted this writ on the premises. Plaintiff was not named
in the writ and continued to reside in the premises.
2

On or about

December 23, 1988, Defendant Garth Howard accused plaintiff of
trespass because she continued to reside in the premises.
8.

On January

5,

1989, defendants

attempted

to remove

plaintiff from the premises with the aid of a police officer. When
that failed, defendants denied plaintiff access to her property by
nailing the building entrances shut and chained shut the gate to
the driveway.

Defendants also seized plaintiff's property.

9.

Plaintiff recovered her property later in January 1989.

10.

Plaintiff

brought

this

action

seeking

damages

for

forcible entry and detainer, wrongful eviction, and infliction of
emotional distress.
From the above FINDINGS OF FACT the Court now enters the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

When defendants were granted a writ of

restitution

against Krukowskis, all of plaintiff's rights in the premises were
terminated because she only held an interest through Krukowskis.
2.

There was no privity of contract between the parties in

this action either by written or oral lease.
3.

Plaintiff had notice of the legal proceedings against

Krukowskis.
4.

In January, 1989, plaintiff was not a tenant but was a

trespasser and was not entitled to any notice or opportunity for
hearing before being excluded from the premises.
5.

Plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants for

exclusion from the premises. Any such claims must be directed
3

against Krukowskis.

Defendants' actions in not naming plaintiff

as a party to the eviction action or to the writ of restitution
were proper.

Service of the writ of restitution by posting was

also proper.
6.

Defendants' actions of evicting plaintiff as a tenant

holding interest through Krukowskis were proper.
7.

Defendants' actions in preventing plaintiff from gaining

access to her property constituted conversion.
8.

Plaintiff is entitled to damages of up to $150, the exact

amount to be determined at a separate hearing.
9.

This a final order for purposes of appeal under Rule

54(b), U.R.Civ.p.

There is no just reason for further delay in

this matter. Judgment shall be entered pursuant to these Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
10.

Each party to bear their own fees and costs.

DATED THIS

day of

, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

PAUL G. GRANT
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: Garth
Howard and Afton Jean Howard, 4125 South 430 East Apt 103, Murray,
UT 84107 on this

day of
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, 1991,
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891

SEP ^3 199,
:V

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
3636 Constitutional Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119
LORI WATERS,
*

Plaintiff,

*
vs.

*

GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON
HOWARD,

it

JUDGMENT

it
it

*

Civil No. 893001449CV

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on the 12th day of October, 1990
before the Hon. Paul G. Grant, judge of the above court. Plaintiff
was present and represented by Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services,
Inc.

Defendants were present and represented themselves.
The Court has previously entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. The Court now enters the following
JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiff is awarded damages for defendant's conversion

of her property, the amount to be determined at a later hearing.
2.

In all other respects, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed

no cause of action.
3.
U.R.Civ.P.

This

is

a

final

judgment

pursuant

to

Rule

54(b),

4.

Each party shall beartheir own £$&$>„ and" Costs.

DATED THIS ^ O

day of

*^2pjfc'ffi'*'''

PAUL G.-^:
CIRCUIT C"

' ***&?* '

'^JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT to: Garth Howard and Afton Jean Howard, 4125
South 430 East Apt 103, Murray, UT 84107 on this __£ &'

day of

, 1991, postage prepaid.
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South Fourth East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
3636 Constitutional Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119
LORI WATERS,
:

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 893001449CV

:

Judge William A. Thorne

Plaintiff,

vs.
GARTH T. HOWARD and
AFTON JEAN HOWARD,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on October 12, 1990, before the
Hon. Paul Grant. The Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and a Judgment on certain of the issues in this case on
September 23, 1991. A further hearing to resolve the remaining
issues was held on May 21, 1992, before the Honorable William A.
Thorne. Plaintiff was present and represented by Eric Mittelstadt
of Utah Legal Services.

Defendants were present and represented

themselves. The court reviewed the file in this matter, and based
upon the stipulation of the parties, now enters the following:
ORDER
1.

Defendants are to pay $50.00 to plaintiff as damages for

the conversion of plaintiff's property as follows: $10.00 by July
5, 1992, and $10.00 each month thereafter until the full amount is
paid.
2.

Payments are to be made to the West Valley Circuit Court.

3*

If

defendants

fail

to

make

the

$10.00

payments,

a

judgment in favor of plaintiff may be entered for $150.00, less any
payments already made.
4.
resolve

The earlier judgment of September 23, 1991 and this Order
all

issues

between

the

parties

in

this

matter

and

constitute a final judgment.

DATED this^/tT~

day of

J ^ f~i~~^

^ 1992;

B¥ THE COURT:

...
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WI&LIAM /A. THORNE /
WESV VALLEY CIRCUIT COURT

jucfeE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER to Garth and Afton Howard, 4125 South 430 East,
Apt.

103,
/J_JJ~Lt

Murray,
/,?/

Utah

84107

on

this

ix

~

day

of

, 1992, postage prepaid.

V < ,'

[bp\waters.ord]

2

?, X ->>

